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Review of risk and uncertainty concepts for climate 




This  paper  discusses  aspects  of  risk  and  uncertainty  relevant  in  an 
interdisciplinary  assessment  of  climate  change policy.  It  opposes  not  only the 
objective  approach  versus  the  subjective  approach,  but  also  situations  when 
precise probabilities are well founded versus situations of broader forms of error 
such  as  Knightian  or  deep  uncertainty,  incompleteness,  vagueness.  Additional 
human  and  social  dimensions  of  ignorance:  strategic  uncertainties,  surprises, 
values diversity, and taboos, are discussed. We argue that the broader forms of 
error affect all sciences, including those studying Nature. For these aspects the 
IPCC guidance notes provides an interdisciplinary unified approach on risk and 
uncertainty.  This  is  a  significant  advance  from  a  simple  multidisciplinary 
justaposition of approaches. However, these guidance notes are not universal, they 
mostly omit the human and social dimensions of ignorance.
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Review of risk and uncertainty concepts
The role of the IPCC is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and 
transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information 
relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate  
change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.
(Principles governing IPCC work, 2003)
1. Introduction
Debates on risk and uncertainty often mingle two deep but distinct questions:
The first is the classical distinction between objective versus subjective 
probabilities. The social sciences literature relevant to climate policy uses both 
notions, so none can be dismissed out of hand. The example of weather risk 
management will show that knowing what the market believe can be as useful as 
knowing objective historical frequencies.
The second question is about the difference between risk and uncertainty. It is 
often agreed that risk refers to situations in which probabilities are well defined, 
while uncertainty refers to a broader form of ignorance. This means that 
probability theory is only one paradigm among others, which is appropriate to 
describe risk but (by definition, so there should be no controversy here) not 
uncertainty. This paper exhibits a few mathematical tools for situations in which 
probabilities are not well defined, but not totally unknown either. It discusses 
examples of contributions to the climate change literature using imprecise 
probabilities.
In this paper I add a third dimension to the debate: passive error versus actively 
constructed ignorance. In a global environmental issue such as climate change, 
risk and uncertainty issues do not solely come from imperfection of knowledge 
about the state of the world. This paper expands the discussion beyond mere 
`errors' to aspects of ignorance caused by human will. The relevance of these 
human and social dimensions to climate policy assessment is discussed, starting 
with the strategic use of information, and then extending to the notion of surprise, 
values uncertainty and taboos.
It might be tempting to segregate the subjective, deep and human dimensions of 
uncertainty as relevant only to the so-called soft or social sciences --i.e. those of 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group III-- with the 
idea that the mandate of `hard' sciences (i.e. those of Working Group I) is 
essentially to provide precise and objective probabilities. This paper's rejects this 
idea. With limited data (and there is only one Earth's climate change experiment), 
even hard science produce imprecise results.
The argument is organized as follows. Sections 2, 3 and 4 explains the 
objective/subjective and the risk/uncertainty dimensions, and explain the methods 
used to deal with them in the sciences related to climate change and climate 
policy. Section 5 describes human and social aspects of ignorance. Section 6 
argues that the broader forms of error affect all sciences, including those studying 
Nature. Section 7 examines how this is accounted for in the IPCC guidance notes 
on risk and uncertainty. Section 8 discusses the significance of that for 
precautionary decision-making. Finally, section 9 concludes  that IPCC guidance 
notes provide a significant advance from a simple multidisciplinary justaposition 
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of approaches, but including the human and social dimensions of ignorance would 
make them more comprehensive.
2. Epistemic differences : objective vs. subjective probabilities
The classical starting point of the discussion about risk and uncertainty is the 
foundation of mathematical probability theory. This foundation is the notion of 
equiprobability, a mathematical idealization of physical situations of perfect 
symmetry.
Mathematical randomness, historically, was based on the self-evident intuitive 
notion of equiprobability , in the same way as points and lines can be considered 
self-evident intuitive notions in Euclidean geometry. Algorithmic information 
theory provides contemporary definitions of randomness  in terms of data 
compression, statistical testing and betting.
But in practical applications involving probabilities, the numbers rarely come 
from the axioms. When assessing the likelihood that the oil price is above 
80$/barrel in 2010, dividing the world in equally probable events makes little 
practical sense. So where do the probability numbers come from ? There is a 
variety of procedures to measure levels of uncertainty. So in addition to the 
probabilities based on symmetry, this paper will distinguish subjective 
probabilities, frequentist probabilities and personal probabilities. Given the 
historical depth and disciplinary width of the literature, there is no unambiguous 
choice of words, but hopefully these three adjectives will sound familiar to 
contemporary economists.
Frequentist approaches determine levels of probability by observation of relative 
frequencies. It works best when a statistically significant body of observations is 
available. On the contrary, when there is a low amount of evidence (a small 
number of observations, missing data, or correlation between experiments), the 
accuracy of numbers determined by relative frequencies is low.
Subjective approaches are based on the idea that the beliefs of a rational agent 
can be discovered by observing its choices. For example, if people buy shares in 
oil companies, it is generally a sign that they expect higher oil prices. This has led 
over the last decade to the creation of prediction markets (see Wolfers et al., 
2004), that is speculative markets designed for the purpose of making predictions. 
Participants bet by trading assets whose final cash value is tied to a particular 
event or parameter. The current market prices can then be interpreted as 
predictions of the probability of the event or of the expected value of the 
parameter. Real-money prediction markets have been set up with some success to 
reveal market beliefs on political, financial, and technology-related questions. 
Regarding energy and environmental questions, there are several public play-
money prediction markets but there is certainly an incentive problem with claims 
that are to be adjudicated in the distant future1.
1 Consider for example the claim CO2LVL - CO2 Level 2030 at the foresight exchange 
prediction market (www.ideosphere.com) : This claim is based on the ambient CO2 level in  
December of 2030. The claim pays $0.01 for each PPM by volume (PPMV) of CO2 in excess  
of 400 PPMV, up to 500 PPMV. For instance, 0.0 for <400.5 PPMV, 0.5 for 450 PPMV, and 
1.0 for >499.5 PPMV. If available, data from the Mauna Loa Observatory will be used to  
judge the claim. This claim opened in may 2002 at around $0.40 (corresponding to 440 ppmv), 
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Personal approaches directly ask people to quantify their strength of opinion or 
level of confidence. There is a psychophysiological basis: studying 
electroencephalograms. Sutton et al. (1965) were able to find a measure of brain 
activity that increases with unpredictable, unlikely, or highly significant stimuli, 
the P300 event-related brain potential. There is ample evidence that the P300 
increases in amplitude as the target’s probability decreases (Polich 2007, 2.3).
A direct method to elicit a probability distribution from experts is to ask them to 
dispatch a stake of 100 chips over the alternative outcomes considered. Formal 
expert surveys are difficult and expensive to conduct rigorously. When led 
according to the best practices in the field they may provide the best information 
available in some situations. They have been used to inform policy-making and 
risk management, for example in the nuclear industry. In a setting such as the 
IPCC writing teams, experts agree verbally.
In contrast to the mathematical approach, for physical applications the operational 
procedure used to measure a variable is fundamental to the definition of what the 
variable is. Even if frequentist, personal and subjective probability distributions 
are defined by the same mathematical properties, they describe different variables. 
They should be viewed as having different units.
There are different viewpoints on the relative merits of these ways to measure 
probabilities. The most important division line lies between the objective and the 
Bayesian views of probabilities2, see Figure 1. Objective probabilities are seen as 
a physical propensity. They are defined using a frequentist approach or using 
“physical laws” models based on symmetry. Bayesian probabilities are seen as 
degrees of beliefs. They are defined either directly, using the personal approaches, 
or indirectly, using subjective probabilities. To summarize, objective probabilities 
are degrees of Truth, while Bayesian probabilities are degrees of Certainty.
VanderMarck (2003) provides an example of the dilemma between subjective and 
frequentist methods in Weather risk management. Weather derivatives are 
contingent financial goods whose value depends on the future weather, such as the 
number of heating degree days through the winter season. Weather is the major 
source of income variability in the energy sector. These financial instruments can 
be used to alleviate that risk. Their market has been developing rapidly since the 
late nineties, along with deregulation in the power industry. To evaluate a 
portfolio of these derivatives, one can use models based on historical weather 
increased, stabilized around $0.70 between mid 2003 to mid 2005, and dropped to around 
$0.56 in early 2060, showing an expected value of 456 ppmv.
2 The same remark as above applies : The precise technical meanings of the words subjective, 
personal and bayesian have varied with time and place.
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Objective probabilities (degrees of Truth)
Mathematical (axioms of randomness)
Frequentist (statistics from data)
Bayesian probabilities (degrees of Certainty)
Personal (directly stated or elicited)
Subjective (from observed choices)
Figure 1: Kinds of probabilities
data: that is an objective frequentist method. But there is also the possibility of 
valuing positions based on current market price levels. Well-known finance and 
econometrics techniques allow to infer the risk-neutral probability distribution of 
an asset from the prices of options on this asset (Hull 1997, chapter 9.2). These 
market-based probability distributions are in essence subjective.
VanderMarck concludes that both techniques can be used, along with hybrid 
approaches. The market-based approach works better when the market is 
sufficiently liquid, i.e. large. Financial institutions tend to be more familiar with 
market valuation than the frequentist model approach, since most other products 
they trade are solely based on supply/demand dynamics. Marking to market also 
ensures a more accurate reflection of a portfolio’s value should it need to be 
liquidated.
This example shows that the subjective methods are necessary when human 
beliefs and expectations are significant variables. This is a sufficient reason to 
allow for Bayesian probabilities in an interdisciplinary assessment of the climate 
change issue, at least in the working group interested in social issues. We will 
argue that there are deeper reasons to use Bayesian approaches even in climate 
sciences, but that discussion is deferred to section 5.
3. Imprecision can be objective
The next important dimension of the debates on risk and uncertainty is the 
distinction between risk and uncertainty. Classically, this paper will use the word 
risk to refer to situations in which precise probabilities are well defined, while 
uncertainty refers to a broader form of ignorance.
Our point is that the two dimensions are orthogonal, so that both risk and 
uncertainty can be either objective or Bayesian To emphasize this uncertainty will 
be discussed first using a subjective approach to uncertainty, and then using an 
objective approach.
As discussed above, the subjective approach suggests to observe betting behavior, 
and use the rationality assumption to infer believed probabilities levels (Ramsey, 
1926, Bruno de Finetti 1937). Indeed if in a football game someone states that 
betting 1:1 on the home team is fair, that can be construed as a statement of 
equiprobability. But stating a “fair” odd is not the same as actually making a bet. 
If a person is observed betting at 1:1 on an event, it might be because he is certain 
that the event will occur, but nobody offered a better rate.
That intuition was seen as weakening the case for the subjective approach by 
Keynes (1921, ch. III par. 4), who explained:
It might perhaps be held that a presumption in favor of the numerical 
valuation of all probabilities can be based on the practice of 
underwriters and the willingness of Lloyd's to insure against 
practically any risk. Underwriters are actually willing, it might be 
urged, to name a numerical measure in every case, and to back their 
opinion with money. But this practice shows no more than many 
probabilities are greater or less than some numerical measure, not that 
they are themselves practically definite. It is sufficient for the 
underwriter if the premium he names exceeds the probable risk.
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Generally, observed betting behavior only implies upper or lower bounds on the 
subjective probabilities. More precisely, observing an economic transaction on a 
contingent good only allows one to infer that the expected value to the buyer was 
greater than the transaction price, and was lower for the seller3. If a rational actor 
buys 30 euros a gambling ticket giving the chance of a 100 euros prize, and 
further sell that ticket for 50 euros, one only learns that to the rational actor, the 
expected value of the ticket was between 30 and 50, so that the probability of 
winning is between 0.3 and 0.5. The mathematics of intervals are more 
complicated than those of point numbers, but Walley (1991)'s seminal book on 
imprecise probabilities demonstrated that Keyne's critique is not fatal to De 
Finetti's subjective view.
Uncertainty that can be represented by interval probability can also arise in a 
purely objective situation. Consider the Ellesberg's urn. This urn is a classical 
image of statistics: drawing a colored marble from a bag containing 100 such 
marbles. Suppose that the bag contains between 30 and 50 black marbles, and the 
other marbles are white. With that information, one can only say that p(black) is 
between 0.3 and 0.5.
Poorly defined probabilities are also an issue in the elicitation of expert 
knowledge. A practical way to elicit probabilities from an expert is to hand out a 
stake of 100 chips and ask the expert to distribute the chips among each 
alternative outcome. The facts that experts often feel uncomfortable doing this 
procedure, and that when one asks an expert a certainty level for each outcome 
separately, numbers do not necessarily add up to unity, suggests that there may 
also be uncertainties about personal probabilities.
4. Beyond the probabilistic model of uncertainty
Having shown that the dimension of precision is orthogonal to the objective vs. 
Bayesian debate, we now discuss five aspects of imprecision. We will call these 
randomness, possibility, deep uncertainty, incompleteness and fuzziness4. To 
support the point made in the previous section, these aspects will be discussed 
using an objective example: the bag with 100 colored marbles introduced above.
Randomness: The composition of the bag is known, so there is a well founded 
probability distribution. For example, assuming an unchanged climate, the 
potential annual supply of wind, sun or hydro power in a given area is a 
statistically known variable. Climate is the average weather in a location over a 
long period of time, so climate predictions are statistical in essence. This example 
shows that scientific predictions are not always deterministic.
Beyond the fundamental indeterminacy in quantum theory, an important reason 
for randomness in science is the problem of scale and chaos. Deterministic 
systems can follow chaotic dynamics, when the imperfect knowledge about the 
3 Only part of the gap between the buyer and the seller's valuation come from the different 
beliefs about the probabilities, another part comes from the different levels of utility provided 
by that good. Still, given the buyer's utility function, observing the transaction provides only a 
lower bound on the buyer's expected value.
4 We do not consider that these five aspects of uncertainty can be ordered from the "least 
uncertain" to the "most uncertain" kind of ignorance. Possibility and deep uncertainty are about 
probabilities, while incompleteness and fuzziness are about the states of the world.
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present state of the world limits to the ability of science to provide predictions at 
the relevant timescale given. For example, the best available socio-economic 
description of the consequences of most mitigation measures are very likely not a 
deterministic model, because the global society is a complex system that may be 
very sensitive to initial conditions. In other words, small perturbations possibly 
lead to large changes in the human response to the climate issue.
Possibility: The list of outcomes is known, and there is an upper bound on the 
number of some colors. For example, the bag contains three colors, less than 30 
black, less than 60 red and less than 100 white marbles. Stating a possibility level 
amounts to state an upper bound on the admissible probability of a future, 
knowing on the other hand that the lower bound is infinitesimal (there is an 
infinity of futures that could happen). Ha-Duong (2003) argued that possibility 
theory (Dubois et al. 1998) is more relevant than probability to quantify the 
plausibility of far-distant futures.
Knightian or Deep Uncertainty: Knight (1921) seminal work describes a class 
of situations where the list of outcomes is known, but the probabilities are 
imprecise. This generalizes both kinds of uncertainty above. An extreme case 
would be that nothing is known about the proportion of each color in the bag. 
However, less unspecific statements could be made that still leave deep 
uncertainty about the drawing's outcome. The situation of interval probability 
presented above,  that p(black) is between 0.3 and 0.5 if it is known that the bag 
contains at least 30 black marbles and 50 white ones, is a simple example of deep 
uncertainty. More generally, imprecise probability theory suggests to represent 
such deep uncertainty using a set of equally admissible probabilities (sets being 
more general than intervals when there is more than two outcomes).
Ha-Duong (2003), Kriegler et al. (2003) , Borsuk et al (2004) and Hall et al. 
(2005)  argued that the kind of ignorance about the long-term future of climate 
change is a situation of Knightian uncertainty that should be treated with 
imprecise probabilities. Kriegler (2005) made an integrated assessment of climate 
change using imprecise probabilities and concluded that it was very unlikely that 
the warming in the 21st century would remain below 2 Kelvin in the absence of 
policy intervention. Moreover, he found that it would require a very stringent 
stabilization level of around 450 ppm CO2 equivalent in the atmosphere to obtain 
a non-negligible value for the lower probability of limiting the warming to 2 
Kelvin.
Incompleteness (absence, unknown unknown, black swans, structural 
uncertainty) relates to things that can not be talked about in a given frame of 
reference: concepts missing from a language or variables not included in a model. 
There would be this kind of uncertainty in the urn example if the list of possible 
colors was not completely known. This is dealt with by using a variety of models 
and by being explicit that any results given are only conditional to the frame of 
reference used.
Probabilities distributions are normally given over a universal set Ω . Randomness 
corresponds to situations when it can be assumed that Ω is exhaustive, and 
incompleteness corresponds to situations when it cannot. Transferable Belief 
Theory suggests to deal with absence by giving some probability weight to the 
empty subset {} (sometimes noted as ∅). It is straightforward to interpret p({}) as 
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the probability of an event not described in Ω . Curiously, most other theories of 
uncertainty make the assumption that Ω is exhaustive, and rarely discuss the idea 
that the empty subset is after all a subset of Ω .
Climate policy assessments cannot get rid of incompleteness: it is impossible to 
consider any and all the technologies and physical processes potentially involved. 
To be precise despite this issue, IPCC guidelines stress the need to explicit as 
much as possible the frame of reference by asking writing teams to explain the 
conditions and the assumptions leading to the conclusions. There are limits to this, 
since no proposition can make sense without a context, but the context can never 
be completely explicit. In any case, it is also important to keep in mind the 
meaning of statements in the global context, because they will be quoted as such 
by the media.
Incompleteness is acute when dealing with scenarios, since a set of scenarios does 
not make an exhaustive frame of reference Ω to describe the alternative futures of 
the energy-economy-climate system. Worst, if scenarios are given with enough 
precision, the probability of the scenario set itself is infinitesimal, since so many 
alternatives are possible. Consequently, while it could be mathematically 
meaningful to assign absolute probabilities level to each scenario within a set, 
these are probabilities conditional to a set of probability zero5.
Fuzziness or vagueness describes the nature of things that don't fall sharply in 
one category or another. This kind of uncertainty is prevalent in natural language. 
In the urn's example, given the full spectrum of colors the number of 'dark' 
marbles would better be represented using a fuzzy number. From a modeling 
point of view, fuzziness contradicts the assumption that states of the world are 
mutually exclusive. It relaxes the modeling assumption that one and only one 
element of the universal set Ω will obtain.
While fuzzy modeling could potentially be used to integrate experts' knowledge 
with precise quantitative information, major integrated assessment models of 
energy and climate problems have not used much these techniques so far. 
Informally, IPCC experts do not ignore the fact that there is vagueness in the 
natural language. For example, the guidance note on uncertainty is explicit that 
categories should be considered as having “fuzzy” boundaries. In the previous 
report, the « burning embers » diagram (TAR WG II fig. SPM 2) used a fuzzy 
graphical representation of « Reasons for concern » to assign a fuzzy quantitative 
meaning to the word `dangerous’ of the UNFCC article 2.
5. Social and human dimensions of uncertainty
Seeing ignorance as a passive condition of an human-therefore-imperfect mind 
caused by missing information about the state of the world misses half of the 
picture. Information is a product. Ignorance can be actively caused by human 
volition. It can even be intentional. This section discusses four social and human 
5 The problem of conditioning with events of probability zero can  be dealt with mathematically. 
Instead of defining conditional probability from the notion of unconditional probability: P(A|B) 
= P(A and B) / P (B), some advanced courses in Probabilities simply assume that unconditional 
probabilities do not exist, and consider conditional probabilities as the basic building block of 
the theory.
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aspects of ignorance: strategic ignorance; surprise; values undecidabillity; and 
taboos. These aspectss are relevant to the study of climate change, mitigation and 
adaptation, because these activities are the outcome of social interactions.
Strategic ignorance involves the fact that rational agents, who are aware of 
information can use uncertainty as a strategic tool. Strategic uncertainties are an 
important human dimension of the response to climate change, since this response 
requires coordination at the international and national level.
Action in the context of strategic ignorance is usually formalized with game 
theory using the hypothesis of information asymmetry, that is assuming that one 
party in a transaction has more or better information than the other party. The 
informed party may therefore be able to extract a rent from this advantage. The 
following aspects of strategic ignorance have been recognized as important in the 
literature:
Adverse selection is a consequence of uncertainty that degrades the quality of the 
participants in a market. Adverse buyer selection occurs in insurance markets : 
agents who know they have a higher risk will buy more insurance than those who 
have a below-average risk. The classical example of adverse seller selection is the 
used cars market described by Akerlof (1970) : owners of good cars will be more 
likely to keep them for themselves. This leads to a vicious situation in which 
buyers presume that most used cars are bad (“lemons”), which may depress the 
price to the point where good car owners are not interested to sell at all.
Moral hazard occurs when the presence of a contract can affect the behavior of 
one or more parties (Mirrlees 1999). For example in the insurance industry, 
coverage of a loss may increase the risk-taking of the insured.
Free riders are actors who consume more than their fair share of a resource, or 
shoulder less than a fair share of the costs of its production. This issue is 
compounded when it is difficult to monitor the behavior of other actors. Even the 
possibility of free riding is likely to affect collective actions.
Information asymmetry is an important issue for the regulation of firms by 
governments and for international agreement. Adverse selection, free riding and 
moral hazard are key factors in the design of mechanisms to mitigate climate 
change.
However, not any strategic use of uncertainty is negative, some are generalities 
aimed at building agreements. Na and Shin (1998) and others suggested that 
generally, reaching an agreement may be easier under a “veil of uncertainty”. 
Cooperation is more likely to emerge ex-ante, before uncertainty is resolved, than 
ex-post, because more agents potentially gain from the agreement before the 
uncertainty is resolved. In contrast, Bramoullé et al. (2004) have shown that, from 
an ex ante perspective, cooperation may be less likely under uncertainty. The 
reason is that the difference in social welfare between cooperation and non-
cooperation, that is the collective gain to reach an agreement, may be lower under 
uncertainty. Finus and Pintassilgo (2010) found the veil of uncertainty generally 
help to stabilize international environmental agreements, but less so when there is 
uncertainty about the costs of joining the agreement in addition to uncertainty on 
the environmental risk.
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Next we turn to social aspects of uncertainty of interest to other disciplines such 
as psychology or anthropology. These have a clear importance for the 
communication and implementation of climate policies, which require 
coordinated changes in people's perceptions and behaviors at all scales.
Surprise means a discrepancy between a stimulus and pre-established knowledge. 
Complex systems, both natural and human, exhibit behaviors that were not 
imagined by observers until they actually happened. Surprise is a subjective 
psychological state, it depends on the observer. It can occur in a situation of 
uncertainty, but also in a situation of randomness if an event with a small personal 
probability (see section 2) realizes.
Surprises arise because recognition of events that do not share many features with 
existing mental structures is difficult. Psychologists further distinguishes between 
two kinds of mental structures: schemata (the plural of the Greek word schema) 
and semantic networks6. `Global Warming' belongs to a schematic mental 
structure because it retains features of the event and relate to perception or 
visceral sensations. `Climatic change' is part of a semantic network, abstract and 
related to language and logic. Kagan (2000) argues that schematic discrepancy is 
distinct from semantic discrepancy, and calls Surprise only the former while he 
terms latter Uncertainty.
Marx et al. (2007) argue that the distinction between experiential versus analytic 
processing is central to understanding the problem of communicating uncertain 
climate information. "Better understanding of experiential processing may lead to 
more comprehensible risk communication products. Retranslation of statistical 
information into concrete (vicarious) experience facilitates intuitive understanding 
of probabilistic information and motivates contingency planning. Sharing 
vicarious experience in group discussions or simulations of forecasts, decisions, 
and outcomes provides a richer and more representative sample of relevant 
experience. The emotional impact of the concretization of abstract risks motivates 
action in ways not provided by an analytic understanding. "
Examples of surprise could include rapid technological breakthroughs, global 
social troubles affecting oil prices or greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions, or 
abrupt change to a cooler climatic trend.
In the IPCC Second Assessment Report, “surprise” were defined as rapid, non 
linear response. This is an incorrect definition for many readers. If no climate 
change at all occur over the next 50 years, that would be a surprise to the science 
community. IPCC guidance notes for the Third Assessment Report acknowledged 
surprise was ambiguously defined previously and that it is, strictly speaking, a 
surprise is an unanticipated outcome. The concept of surprise was not discussed in 
the guidance notes on uncertainty for assessement reports four and five 
(Mastrandrea et al. 2011).
By allowing decision makers to get familiar in advance with a number of diverse 
but plausible futures, scenarios are one way of reducing surprises. Scenarios do 
not only allow to test existing strategies against a wide range of futures, they also 
facilitate stakeholders participation and allow to plant signposts allowing to 
recognize early which future is happening.
6 The difference between these two forms of knowledge is also known as the difference between 
Symbol and Sign in linguistics.
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Values undecidability. Some things are not assigned a truth level because it is 
generally agreed that they cannot be verified, such as the mysteries of Faith, 
personal tastes or belief systems. While these cannot be judged to be true or false 
or given a mathematical distribution they can have bearing on both behavior and 
environmental policymaking.
Diversity is a source of resilience. In time, a society where a variety of decision 
makers have a diverse set of values may be more robust to adverse environmental 
change than a less internally diverse society.
Model-based decision analysis deals with this kind of uncertainty by isolating it in 
the parameters of a social welfare function. The social welfare function is 
supposed to be given by the decision-maker, the scientific model is only here to 
find how to maximize it. These parameters commonly include intergenerational 
equity parameters (the discount rate), attitudes towards risk (the risk aversion 
coefficient) and international equity parameters (Negishi weights).
Some administrations indeed prescribe the discount rate to use when evaluating 
the costs and benefits of public projects. This is not the case for climate policy 
analysis models. There is no single decision-making authority to decide on how 
welfare should be measured. Thus, the "exogenous social welfare function" 
approach to deal with values undecidability has limits:
• Empirical estimates have to be conducted to determine which values of the 
social welfare parameters are most consistent with the observed behaviors. 
This is fraught with the uncertainties inherent in abductive inference (see 
section 6 below). Moreover, there is no agreement that observed behavior 
coincide with the desirable social welfare function. For example, some 
have argued that a normative rather than descriptive discount rate should 
be used.
• Values uncertainty creep up in models outside the social welfare function. 
Tradeoffs between the three pillars of sustainable development are an 
example. How to balance progress on economic well-being, saved 
statistical lives and conserved ecosystems ?
• Some negative consequences of the arbitrariness in choosing the 
parameters of the social welfare function can be avoided, if sensitivity 
analysis are used and show the robustness of results. Unfortunately, 
important results --like the optimal level of effort against climate change 
in the near term-- are not robust. See the Stern-Nordhaus debates on the 
discount rate for example.
• For technical reasons, the commonly used utility functions restrict the 
range of values that can be represented. For example Ha-Duong and 
Treich (2004) have shown that standard intertemporal expected utility 
functions are less apt to represent precaution than the more general Kreps-
Porteus recursive utility functions.
Because of values undecidability, model-based decision analysis can only help to 
agree on the disagreements. Dialogue is used to coordinate action in spite of 
differences which can not be erased.
Taboos matters are what people must not know or even inquire about (Smithson 
1988, p. 8). Originally, the word was related to sacred matters and religious 
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customs in South Pacific people. Here I will use the word in a technical sense, to 
mean "things that are off limit to discuss for social reasons". These actively 
created areas of uncertainty exist in any social group, they are part of what defines 
a social group.
IPCC authors work under the mission statement "be policy relevant but not 
policy-prescriptive". IPCC assessments are bound by a double set of limits which 
arise not only because of its scientific mandate, but also because of its political 
essence.
The scientific mandate means that art and culture works, however influencial, are 
off limits to discuss. While ideally the IPCC would assess all the relevant 
literature for climate change mitigation, it says little on population policies, for 
example. It publishes few economic scenarios where the less developing countries 
do not catch up fast. IPCC global scenarios for the XXIst century look unlike the 
XXth century from a financial and military stability point of view. Taboos on 
nuclear power; oil supply; or national security issues can impact climate policy 
assessments.
Most important IPCC productions, such as the Summary for Policymakers, are 
approved line-by-line in plenary with government experts. The diplomatic 
community has lots of 'non negotiable' points. Indeed B. Müller [p. 68] explains 
the pace of climate negotiations as a stand off between two taboos that happen to 
be the key issues for the opposite party : the refusal of developing countries to 
discuss commitments and the refusal by industrialized countries to discuss 
anything that could remotely be interpreted as an admission of climate impact 
liability, such as the question of primary entitlement of emissions rights.
Taboos biase scientific assessments because what is morally unjust is not 
necessarily unlikely. To deal with taboos in an organization, it is necessary to get 
input from outside the social group.
Concluding the first descriptive part of this paper, Figure 2 summarizes our 
review of risk and uncertainty concepts so far. In the second part of this paper, we 
examine how these concepts are handled in the scientific community working on 
climate change.
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Error: ignorance that needs to be corrected
Vagueness (Fuzzy theory)
Incompleteness or absence (Logics, Transferable Belief Model)
Knightian or deep uncertainty (Imprecise probability)
Possibility (Possibility theory)
Risk (Probability)
Social and human dimensions: actively constructed ignorance
Strategic uncertainty (Game theory)
Surprise (Psychology)
Taboos (Sociology)
Values undecidability (Cultural studies)
Figure 2: An ontology of kinds of ignorance (with relevant methods).
6. The nature of scientific knowledge
This section argues that the broader forms of error affect all sciences, including 
those studying Nature. Not only Science cannot be perfectly deterministic, it 
cannot be precisely probabilistic either. To see why, let us remind ourselves that 
reasoning is usually classified in three kinds of inference: deductive, inductive and 
abductive.
Deductive inference derives a specific result from general premises (A implies B, 
A holds, therefore B). It is the safest way to make a conclusion. Example: 
Increasing the CO2 concentration increases radiative forcing, this planet's CO2 
concentration has increased, therefore this planet's radiative forcing has increased.
Inductive inference learns general rules from specific cases. Induction is less 
powerful that deduction, as the truth of the premises make it only likely that the 
conclusion is also true. Example: The historical rate of decrease in energy 
intensity per unit of value appears to have averaged about 1 percent per year since 
the mid-nineteenth century (Nakicenovic 1996), therefore it is reasonable to 
include an autonomous rate of energy efficiency improvement in energy policy 
models.
Abductive inference allows one to learn a general hypothesis by observing a 
particular case using a general rule (A causes B, observing B, therefore suspecting 
A). This is also known as « detective logic ». It is even weaker than the previous 
kinds of inference, as it runs contrary to deduction. Example: There is coral 
bleach all over the world. Global climatic change would explain that better than 
anything else. Therefore, there (probably) is global climatic change.
Deduction is the most convincing form of reasoning. Formal validity, that is the 
absence of contradiction in the reasoning, is straightforward to check. When the 
inference is logically valid, checking the truth of the premises ensures the truth of 
the result. In this case, the reasoning is sound. Deductive reasoning is mostly what 
numerical computer models do.
One source of uncertainty in science for policy is the difficulty in observing 
global systems. For example numeric models simulating the evolution of the 
ocean-atmosphere-ice-land  earth system have to be calibrated with much less 
than one measurement per grid cell per variable. Energy economic models 
generally have data on trade flows, consumption patterns and technological costs, 
but not with the same precision for all regions of the world. In both classes of 
models, the quality of observations degrades considerably when looking more 
than forty years backwards -- a problem when looking more than ninety years 
forward.
This is not theoretically a problem with deduction. When the premises are 
uncertain, valid reasoning allows to propagate that uncertainty to the conclusions. 
Techniques like Monte Carlo simulations allow to propagate probabilistic 
uncertainty from the premises to the results. Computational limits may be an 
issue. Absent probabilities, for example when there is a set of scenarios, 
uncertainty propagation techniques are mostly ad hoc. This is an interesting active 
research  frontier, but this introduces a methodological bias. In theory the outcome 
should not be probabilistic either.
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Even when the reasoning is formally valid and specific facts are well observed, 
the general rule used for deductive inference may be uncertain. Rules are not 
given from Above, they have to be discovered by scientists' from observed facts. 
Thus, science cannot be solely based on deductive logic, scientists have to use 
induction. Induction is necessary, but can never be certain because there is no 
finite answer to the fundamental question : How many specific cases are needed to 
infer a general rule? Let us consider two polar cases:
• The scientific method bases induction on repeated verifiable experiments: 
a potentially infinite number of observations. Even in this ideal situation, 
inductive reasoning is open to revision if a counter-example is shown. 
Scientific laws are open to revision when new facts require it. The 
provisory nature of scientific knowledge is an instance of incompleteness 
(in reference to Figure 2), a kind of uncertainty not handled well by 
probabilities. The biggest scientific advances are also those that vastly 
increase, rather than decrease, the number of open questions.
• Many in the Humanities and Social Sciences have no use of the 
experimental method and do not see "laws" of nature as necessary in their 
research field. We can do with "stylized facts". Consider for example one 
very fundamental tenet of Economics: demand and offer. It says that a 
higher price leads to a lower demand for a normal good. If one forecasts a 
higher price of oil for the next decade, can one deduct that oil consumption 
will decline ? That conclusion is controversial, it is quite possible that the 
consumption increases as well. Factors such as the supply curve in other 
energy sources, energy policies, economic and demographic expansion 
will affect the equilibrium price level.
Most scientists are practical and compromise between these two extreme attitudes. 
When they find overwhelming evidence supporting a persistent pattern, they call 
it a scientific law, even if the evidence does not come from controlled 
experiments. The alternative would be to reserve the word "science" for a very 
restricted set of activities, the "hard sciences". Outside the laboratory, the 
conditions are never exactly the same.
Probability theory offers a powerful language to deal with uncertainty, and using 
probabilistic reasoning is certainly necessary to deal with induction. There is no 
space to review all the longstanding philosophical discussions here, some have 
even argued that probability is "the logic of science" (Jaynes et al. 2003). I argue 
that precise probability theory is not sufficient to express scientific knowledge. It 
works well only towards one end of the spectrum: wher there are a lot of data. I 
ague that when data is scarce, it is preferable to express knowledge imprecisely.
For example, economists often assume that the correct way of learning is to use 
Bayesian learning, limited to precise probabilities. This does not resolve the 
deeper kinds of uncertainties discussed in section 3 such as possibility and 
Knightian uncertainty. Imprecise probabilities would make the difference between 
an even chance (knowing only that p = 0.5) and no information (knowing only 
that 0 <= p <= 1). If and when the mathematical models of learning are extended 
to imprecise probabilities, the problems of incompleteness and vagueness will 
remain to be solved, not to mention the human dimensions of science.
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Ioannidis (2005) exposes the extend to which the problem of induction is poorly 
solved by our methods used today. He argued that most published research 
findings in medicine are false, simply because of technical problems with pre-
study odds, insufficient statistical power of experiments and biases. He added that 
"for many current scientific fields, claimed research findings may often be simply 
accurate measures of the prevailing bias." To determine the effects of a new drug 
or therapy is an induction problem of great practical importance, but the officially 
reviewed methods do not seem to resolve it well.
The variety of accepted practical rules for scientific reasoning is another sign that 
the problem of is fundamentally not solved. Different scientific disciplines will 
have different methods of statistical testing: some would use parametric methods, 
other non-parametric methods, and others Bayesian methods. The 95% usual level 
of confidence for statistical testing is completely arbitrary and culturally 
determined. The theoretical physics community, for example, requires a 
99.99994% surety (5 sigma confidence level) to declare that an elementary 
particle has been discovered. Within each discipline, culture and history have a 
role in determining the accepted way to establish scientific results.
Scientific inductive reasoning may be superior to informal inductive reasoning, as 
human minds tend to jump quickly to generalizations from a few observations. 
But there is no known general mathematical method for induction. It is not 
completely solved by probability theory and statistics, especially when the 
number of observations is low.
The methodological situation is even worse with respect to abductive reasoning. 
Abduction is necesary for the everyday conduct of science, for example to guess 
the hypothesis to be verified. Abduction is also important for practical policy 
questions. For example, the attribution of global warming to the use of fossil fuels 
by humans, as opposed to the natural factors like the variability of climate or the 
sun has been a popular scientific discussion. Pearl (2009) argued that causal 
analysis had produced many results in the past few decades, which were hardly 
known to researchers who could put them into practical use.
In summary, there are fundamental reasons why imprecision should be a problem 
for all scientific disciplines. The broader forms of error affect not only the 
sciences studying Humans and Societies, but also those studying Nature.
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7. Risk and uncertainty in IPCC's guidance note
This section discusses Hassol et al. (1997) and Mastrandrea et al. (2 011), the 
IPCC guidance notes on risk and uncertainty. We show that they provide an 
interdisciplinary unified approach to risk and uncertainty which account for the 
conclusions of the previous section.
The climate change scientific community has been refining its guidelines on how 
to deal with risk and uncertainty over three assessment reports writing cycles. 
This effort's outcome is a short reference document (Mastrandrea et al. 2010), 
widely peer-reviewed and field tested multiple times with thousands of 
interdisciplinary scientists from a variety of cultural origins. The document 
"define s a common approach and calibrated language that can be used broadly for 
developing expert judgments and for evaluating and communicating the degree of 
certainty in findings of the assessment process."
The IPCC guidance note (Mastrandrea et al. 2010) relies on two metrics for 
communicating the degree of certainty in key findings:
• Confidence in the validity of a finding, based on the type, amount, quality,  
and consistency of
 evidence (e.g., mechanistic understanding, theory, data, models, expert  
judgment) and the
 degree of agreement. Confidence is expressed qualitatively. 
• Quantified measures of uncertainty in a finding expressed 
probabilistically (based on statistical analysis of observations or model  
results, or expert judgment). 
The guidance note leaves it to the scientists to assess, in terms appropriate for 
their discipline, what constitutes robust evidence (How many observations are 
needed to infer that a result ?) Thus, the guidance note does not seek to limit 
writing teams to a single approach. As Swart et al. (2008) discussed, agreeing to 
disagree allows the assessment to reflect the variety of risk and uncertainty 
analysis methods used in the vast climate change literature.
The confidence metric is explicitly qualitative. Using it is a prerequisite to using 
numerical assessment of uncertainties. Numbers are only justified for findings 
backed by robust evidence or high agreement, preferably both. This corroborates 
our claim that probability is not sufficient as the langage of science.
The guidance note calibrated langage for describing quantified uncertainty in the 
form of a likelihood scale. For example, "very likely" corresponds to "90-100% 
probability",  "very unlikely" corresponds to "0-10% probability", and "virtually 
certain" to "99-100% probability"7. This is another use of imprecise probabilities.
The IPCC guidance note views uncertainty as a limit of scientific reasoning 
(deduction, induction and abduction) caused by the imperfection of empirical 
evidence. In terms of Figure 2's typology of kinds of ignorance, it is focused on 
the Error, as opposed to Social and human dimensions of uncertainty. Those are 
7
 The guidance note adds that "in some cases, it may be appropriate to describe findings for which 
evidence and understanding are overwhelming as statements of fact without using uncertainty 
qualifiers."
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largely not discussed in the guidance note.
8. Discussion: imprecision and decision-making
This section explains why it is critical to properly report imprecision in scientific 
assessments. It is because of the precautionary principle.
Decision-making when probabilities are well defined not the same as 
decisionmaking under deeper uncertainty. Uncertainty characterizes both the costs 
and benefits of climate policies, and under these conditions the standard decision-
making criteria based on the maximization of expected utility, also called the 
Rational Actor Paradigm, is not robust. Most theories of decision making under 
uncertainty do not assume that it is always coherent or even possible to optimize 
expected utility. These include generalized expected utility by Ellesberg (2001), 
Knightian decision-making discussed in Bewley (2002)  and Walley (2000), the 
rank-dependent expected utility and Prospect Theory. Some would argue that 
social decision making follows a system of procedural rules that are determined 
by evolution and selection rather than forward-looking rationality.
By this paper's definition, under uncertainty a probability distribution is not well 
defined, so that the expected value of a contingent good is described by an interval 
rather than a precise number. Knightian decision making remarks that intervals 
are not totally ordered as real numbers are, and brings forward the intuition that 
under uncertainty alternative acts may sometimes be incomparable. When there 
are large uncertainties (meaning expected value intervals are large) about a policy, 
it might not be possible to conclude clearly that the expected costs are less than 
the expected benefits. In this situation, the concept of a globally optimal choice is 
replaced by a set of equally admissible but incomparable choices.
Is there reason to believe that the issues with the Rational Actor Paradigm under 
uncertainty count for climate policy ? When the expected value of a good is an 
interval, the interval's lower bound can be interpreted as the maximum price 
acceptable to buy that good, namely the willingness to pay (WTP). Conversely, 
the upper bound can be viewed as the willingness to accept (WTA). This ties the 
degree of uncertainty regarding  the value of the good with the WTA - WTP 
difference, a well studied anomaly of the Rational Actor Paradigm. Empirical 
research consistently finds that when people are asked to value non market goods, 
such as the quality of the environment, the gap between the two values can be 
significant. Moreover, Horowitz et al. (2002) meta-analysis found that the less the 
good is “like an ordinary market good”, the higher is the WTA/WTP ratio. Since 
climate stability and technical progress are not ordinary market goods at all, there 
is reason to believe that an evaluation of the climate policy would be subject 
indeed to the large WTA/WTP ratio effects.
9. Concluding summary
In the first part, this paper outlined a few philosophical dimensions of the risk and 
uncertainty debate in the context of climate change mitigation. It opposed not only 
the objective approach (viewing probabilities as degrees of truth) versus the 
Bayesian approach (viewing them as degrees of certainty), see Figure 1, but also 
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situations of risk (related to situations where precise probabilities are well 
founded) versus situations of Knightian uncertainty (a broader form of ignorance). 
Then it added a the difference between error that must be corrected, and ignorance 
actively constructed by humans. Figure 2 summarizes this taxonomy.
In the second part, the paper argued that the broader forms of error affect all 
sciences, including those studying Nature. This was shown by reminding that 
scientific certainty is provisory at best, and that in most practical situations key 
scientific findings have to be formulated in an uncertainty framework because of 
the problem of induction. Not only Science cannot be perfectly deterministic, it 
cannot be precisely probabilistic either. That point is illustrated with the IPCC 
guidance note on risk and uncertainty. They provide an interdisciplinary 
framework severly bounding the applicability domain of probability numbers. It is 
critical to properly report imprecision in scientific assessments because it changes 
the decision-making situation.
We noted that the IPCC guidance notes use imprecise probabilities, but do not 
discuss the social and human dimensions of uncertainty: strategic uncertainties, 
surprises, metaphysics and taboos.
The main novelty of the 2010 version of IPCC guidance note is the introduction of 
the "Agreement" scale, which is meant to describe the extend to which 
information sources point in the same direction. That novelty could be developed 
by requiring the authors to reflect on the reasons for disagreement. Disagreements 
on oil reserves and peak oil, for example, are in a large part explained by the 
strategic manipulation of information. On the other hand, values undecidability 
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